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Abstract
Relying on a literal interpretation of Webers law in psychophysics,
we show that a simple condition of independence across good cate-
gories implies the Cobb-Douglas preferences.
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JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Cobb-Douglas utility functions enjoy great popularity as an example of con-
sumer preferences. They exhibit many nice theoretical properties (such as
monotonicity, convexity, homotheticity) as well as analytic tractability, and
these make them favorites for classroom and estimation alike. Clearly, these
functions are limited in many ways, and even an intermediate micro course
would soon move on to examples of preferences with richer substitution and
complementarity e¤ects. Still, Cobb-Douglas preferences seem to retain their
primacy in textbooks and in empirical work despite and most probably be-
cause of their simplicity.
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This note points out that there are other reasons for which one might
be interested in Cobb-Douglas preferences. Studies in psychophysics suggest
that humans do not have a perfect perception ability, and, further, that per-
ception behaves in a rather orderly way. Specically, Webers Law (Weber,
1834) o¤ers the logarithmic function as the scaling of a stimulus such that
the just noticeable di¤erence becomes constant. A result in Argenziano
and Gilboa (2017) shows that a mild separability condition (across goods, or
good categories) implies that preferences over bundles are representable by
linear functions of the logarithms. Combined, one obtains the Cobb-Douglas
preferences (in their logarithmic representation). While these preferences re-
main over-simplistic for many purposes, it is interesting to know that, among
the classes of simple functions, there is a particular reason to choose them,
beyond mathematical convenience.
2 Webers Law and Semi-Orders
Weber (1834) was interested in the minimal degree of change in a stimulus
needed for this change to be noticed. For a physical stimulus (such as weight
or length) of size S, let S be the minimal increase of the stimulus level so
that (S + S) can be discerned as larger than S at least 75% of the trials.
Webers law states that this threshold behaves proportionately to S. That
is, there exists a constant c > 1 that
(S + S)=S = c:
Thus, if the base-level stimulus is multiplied by a factor a > 0, the min-
imal change required to be noticed (with the same threshold probability) is
aS. Equivalently, a change S will be noticed only if
log (S + S)  log (S) >   log (c) > 0: (1)
This law is considered a rather good rst approximation and it appears
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in most introductory psychology textbooks.1
Luce (1956) used this observation to rene the model of consumer choice.
In a famous example, he argued that one cannot claim to have strict prefer-
ences between a cup of co¤ee with n and one with (n+ 1) grains of sugar, for
any n. Hence, two such cups would be equivalent in the eyes of the decision
maker. This implies that we are bound to observe violations of transitivity of
preferences: we will often observe a long chain of equivalences between close
quantities, while the alternatives at the ends of the chain are not indi¤erent.
Luce therefore dened binary relations that he dubbed semi-orders, allow-
ing for some types of intransitive indi¤erences. For the sake of our discussion,
we can think of a semi-order as a binary relation , denoting strict prefer-
ence, that can be represented by a pair (u; ) where u is a utility function on
the set of alternatives and  > 0 is a threshold called the just noticeable
di¤erence (jnd) such that, for every x; y,
x  y iff u(x)  u(y) >  (2)
In the absence of (strict) preference between two alternatives, x; y, that is, if
neither x  y nor y  x holds, we will write x ^ y. If  is a semi-order, it
follows that ^ is a reexive and symmetric relation, and, indeed, for every
x; y,2
x ^ y iff ju(x)  u(y)j   (3)
Given a semi-order , one can also dene the associated equivalence
1It is often mentioned in the context of the Weber-Fechner law. Fechner (1860) was
interested also in subjective perception. Over the past decades, Stevenss power law is
considered to be a better approximation of subjective perceptions than is Fechners law.
However, as far as discernibility is concerned, Webers law probably still holds the claim
to be the best rst approximation. See Algom (2001).
2One can also think of semi-orders where strict preference is represented by a weak
inequality, and indi¤erence ^ by a strict inequality. See Beja and Gilboa (1992) for
details and necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of each representation.
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relation, , as follows: for every x; y, x  y if and only if
8z; x  z , y  z
and
8z; z  x, z  y
Naturally, x  y implies x ^ y, but the converse is not generally true.
Indeed,  is an equivalence relation, and, given a representation of , (u; ),
one may assume that it also satises
x  y iff u(x) = u(y) (4)
Under some richness conditions, this will follow from (2).
It is easy to see that the utility function u in (2) is not only ordinal. One
can use a monotone transformation of u, f : R! R, to represent preferences
by v = f (u), only if, for every ;  2 R,
j  j   iff jf ()  f ()j  
Thus, the function f above can be any arbitrary strictly increasing func-
tion over the [0; ] interval, as long as f ()   f (0) = , but the number of
-stepsbetween two alternatives has to be respected by any function that
represents preferences, whether measured on the original u scale or on the
transformed v scale. Accordingly, the number of just-noticeable-di¤erence
() steps between alternatives can provide a measure of the intensity of pref-
erences and thereby to provide empirical meaning to claims such as the
marginal utility of money is decreasing.
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3 Aggregation of Semi-Orders
We cite a result regarding the aggregation of n semi-orders, each dened on
R+, to a semi-order dened on their product space, Rn+. The result is a
special case of the main result of Argenziano and Gilboa (2017), cited here
for completeness of exposition.3
There are n product categories. Let xi > 0 denote an amount of product
category i  n, so that consumption bundles are vectors
x = (x1; :::; xn) 2 X  Rn+:
For each category i  n the consumer has semi-ordered preferences i on
R+ that are represented by (vi; i) as follows: for every xi; yi > 0
xi  i yi iff vi(xi)  vi(yi) > i (5)
xi ^ i yi iff jvi(xi)  vi(yi)j  i
Preferences over each category are assumed to be monotonically increasing,
and the main information conveyed by vi is the number of jnds that one can
nd between two values xi and yi.
We assume that vi is strictly monotone and continuous, and that i > 0.
We will also assume that for each i, i is unbounded from above: for every
xi 2 R+, there exists yi 2 R+ such that yi i xi. The representation (5)
implies that vi is unbounded, and its continuity implies that its range is
Ri  image (vi) = [vi (0) ;1).
We assume that the consumer has semi-ordered preferences  on the set
of bundles Rn+ that is represented by (u; 0) with 0 > 0. Without loss of
generality we assume that 0 = 1. Thus, u : Rn+ ! R is such that, for every
3The result in Argenziano and Gilboa (2017) is stated for vectors in Rm for each of
n individuals. Here we consider but one individual, and each component is a good, or a
goods category. Mathematically, we cite the result for the special case of m = 1.
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x; y 2 Rn+,
x  y iff u(x)  u(y) > 1 (6)
x ^ y iff ju(x)  u(y)j  1
We similarly assume that u is continuous.
For z 2 X and xi > 0 we denote by (z i; xi) 2 X the bundle obtained by
replacing the i-th component of z, zi, by xi. The main assumption we use is4
Separability: For every i, every z 2 X and every xi; yi > 0,
(z i; xi)  (z i; yi) iff xi i yi
Observe that, if all jnds were zero, Separability would boil down to simple
monotonicity. In the presence of semi-ordered preferences, Separability still
states that, if we focus on category i, and hold all other categories xed, the
consumers ability to discern di¤erences in quantities is independent of the
quantities of the other product categories. This assumption may evidently
be violated, especially if there are complementarity and substitution e¤ects
between the categories. But it seems to be a reasonable benchmark.
For the statement of the result we need the following denition: a jnd-grid
of allocations is a collection A  X such that, for every x; y 2 A and every
i 2 N ,
vi (xi)  vi (yi) = kii for some ki 2 Z
Thus, a jnd-grid is a countable subset of bundles, such that the utility dif-
ferences between any two elements thereof, for any category, is an integer
multiple of that categorys jnd.
We can now cite
4In Argenziano-Gilboa (2017) the corresponding assumption is referred to as Consis-
tency. While Consistency was suggested as a normative principle in the context of social
choice, here it is but a descriptive assumption on individual preferences.
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Theorem 1 (Argenziano-Gilboa, 2017) Let there be given (i)in ; ((vi; i))in,
 and u as above. Separability holds i¤ there exists a strictly monotone, con-
tinuous
g :
nY
i=1
Ri ! R
such that for every x 2 X
u (x) = g (v1 (x1) ; :::; vn (xn))
and, for every jnd-grid A  X there exists c 2 R such that, for every x 2 A,
u (x) = c+
nX
i=1
1
i
vi (xi)
4 Cobb-Douglas Preferences
We now wrap up the above to conclude that Webers law, interpreted lit-
erally, and coupled with the Separability assumption, yields Cobb-Douglas
preferences. Indeed, let us assume that, for each category i, given any current
quantity xi > 0, the consumer would notice the di¤erence xi i¤
xi + xi
xi
> c
for a xed c > 1. Thus, (xi + xi) i xi i¤
log (xi + xi)  log (xi) > i (7)
with i > 0. Thus, Webers law applied to each good category i implies that
the consumer has semi-ordered preferences over each category, which can be
represented by the pair (log(xi); i).
Further, assume that Separability holds. Then Theorem (1) implies that,
on any jnd-grid,
u (x) =
nX
i=1
1
i
log (xi) (8)
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which are Cobb-Douglas preferences for coe¢ cients i = 1i . Note that,
as mentioned in Section 2 in the presence of semi-ordered preferences, the
consumers utility function is not ordinal. In particular, if the function (8)
is replaced by
w (x) =
nY
i=1
(xi)
i (9)
we will not obtain a representation of preferences as in (6).5
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